BIFR Scheme Cannot Bind State Without Express Approval Under SICA, Rules Rajasthan High Court
BIFR Scheme Cannot Bind State Without Express Approval Under SICA, Rules Rajasthan High Court Lords Chloro Alkali Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 990/2018Judgment dated 19 December 2025 The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, has dismissed a writ petition filed by Lords Chloro Alkali Ltd., holding that a rehabilitation scheme sanctioned by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction cannot be enforced against the State Government in the absence of express consent as required under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The Court also found that prolonged non-compliance by the company itself disentitled it from any relief under writ jurisdiction. The petition arose from demand notices issued in 2017 by the Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation for recovery of dues relating to an Interest Free Sales Tax Loan. The company contended that these demands violated a rehabilitation scheme sanctioned by BIFR in November 2006, under which the sales tax liability was settled at 26.58 per cent of the principal amount, payable in instalments without interest. On this basis, the company sought quashing of the demand notices and enforcement of the sanctioned scheme. Tracing the background, the Court noted that the company had been declared a sick industrial unit in 2002 and that a final rehabilitation scheme was approved in 2006 after circulation to various stakeholders. While the scheme contemplated substantial concessions, including in respect of sales tax dues, the State Government and its nodal agency, RIICO, disputed that any binding consent had ever been granted for such concessions. The High Court examined whether the scheme could bind the State in the absence of express consent under Section 19(2) of SICA. It found that no document or record showed affirmative approval by the competent authority of the State Government for waiver or reduction of sales tax liabilities. The order of BIFR itself recorded that RIICO had only stated that the proposal was under consideration and that settlements below the principal amount were generally not accepted, which, according to the Court, could not be treated as consent. Rejecting the argument of deemed consent, the Court held that internal correspondence, file notings, or prolonged silence cannot substitute the statutory requirement of express consent when public revenue is involved. Relying on settled judicial precedents, the Court reiterated that BIFR has no power to compel a State Government to grant fiscal concessions without such consent, and that schemes lacking this requirement are unenforceable against the State. The Court also took serious note of the petitioner’s conduct. It observed that despite the scheme prescribing a clear repayment schedule from 2006 onwards, the company had failed to make any payment for nearly eleven years and deposited an amount only in 2017. This prolonged non-compliance, the Court held, amounted to a fundamental breach of the scheme and eroded any equitable basis for invoking writ jurisdiction. On the issue of repeal of SICA, the Court acknowledged that repeal does not automatically nullify sanctioned schemes. However, it clarified that only legally binding components of a scheme survive repeal, and a provision that was never enforceable against the State for want of consent cannot be revived later. Applying the doctrine of laches, the High Court held that the petitioner’s delay and inaction were fatal to its claim. It observed that discretionary relief under Article 226 cannot be granted to a party that has failed to perform its own obligations and approaches the Court after an inordinate lapse of time. For these reasons, the Jaipur Bench concluded that the writ petition lacked merit and dismissed it, thereby upholding the demand notices issued by RIICO and reinforcing the principle that State consent is mandatory before any rehabilitation scheme can impose financial concessions affecting public revenue.
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Rajasthan High Court Rejects Third Bail Plea of Police Constable in Bharatpur Murder Case, Relies on Call Records Showing Criminal Conspiracy
Rajasthan High Court Rejects Third Bail Plea of Police Constable in Bharatpur Murder Case, Relies on Call Records Showing Criminal Conspiracy Case Title: Ravindra Singh S/o Rambharosi v. State of RajasthanCourt: High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at JaipurCitation: S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous III Bail Application No. 10667/2025Date of Judgment: December, 2025 The present judgment arises from the third bail application moved by the accused-petitioner Ravindra Singh under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. The petitioner was arrested in connection with FIR No. 218/2023 registered at Police Station Halena, District Bharatpur, for serious offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The matter was heard and decided by the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Praveer Bhatnagar, with the Court delivering a reasoned and complete judgment declining bail. The petitioner contended that he had been falsely implicated in the case and that no direct or substantive evidence existed to establish his role in the alleged conspiracy leading to the murder of Kuldeep Singh and the grievous injuries caused to Vijaypal. It was argued that his earlier bail application had been rejected with liberty to renew the prayer after recording the statement of the injured witness, and that subsequent developments, including material witnesses turning hostile, justified reconsideration. Emphasis was also placed on the petitioner’s long incarceration and his status as a police constable. The State and the complainant strongly opposed the bail plea, drawing the Court’s attention to the background of the case and the alleged motive. It was argued that the petitioner is the real brother of Kripal Singh, whose murder had preceded the present incident, and that the killing of Kuldeep Singh was an act of revenge carried out pursuant to a criminal conspiracy. The prosecution relied heavily on call detail records collected during investigation, which indicated sustained and repeated contact between the petitioner and the principal assailants before and after the incident. It was further pointed out that the bail application of a similarly placed co-accused, Aaditya, had already been dismissed by the High Court, and that the petitioner’s case stood on identical footing. Upon a careful perusal of the material on record, the High Court examined the call detail analysis placed by the investigating agency. The judgment records that the petitioner had made and received a significant number of calls with key co-accused over an extended period, clearly suggesting continuous communication. The Court took note of the fact that these call records formed part of an elaborate investigation and prima facie supported the prosecution’s allegation of conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC. The Court found that such evidence could not be lightly brushed aside at the stage of considering bail, particularly in a case involving allegations of murder motivated by revenge. The High Court also placed weight on the principle of parity, observing that the case of the petitioner was not distinguishable from that of the co-accused whose bail had already been rejected. The Court held that, in the absence of any new or exceptional circumstance, there was no justification to take a different view in the petitioner’s third bail application. The seriousness of the offence, the nature of allegations, and the prima facie material indicating a conspiratorial role weighed decisively against the grant of bail. Concluding its analysis, the Court held that, at the present stage, it was not inclined to enlarge the accused-petitioner on bail. Accordingly, the third bail application was dismissed. The judgment underscores the Rajasthan High Court’s consistent approach that in cases involving grave offences like murder coupled with conspiracy, sustained call-based linkage between accused persons can constitute strong prima facie material sufficient to deny bail, especially when earlier bail pleas have already been rejected on merits. Read complete order here
High Court Upholds Acquittal Where Evidence Is Conflicting — Jaipur Bench Confirms Trial Court Finding
High Court Upholds Acquittal Where Evidence Is Conflicting — Jaipur Bench Confirms Trial Court Finding Case Title: State of Rajasthan v. Ramkesh & Mukesh — D.B. Criminal Leave to Appeal No. 146/2024.Date of Judgment: 11 December 2025. The facts of the case, as recorded by the trial court, relate to an incident on 20 September 2014 near a water tank at Lavana in which the deceased, Krishna Kumar, allegedly suffered injuries after an altercation and a subsequent vehicle impact. The prosecution case, set out in the police report and charge sheet, accused the respondents of causing grievous injuries and of an overt act of running the deceased down by hitting him with a Bolero vehicle (bearing registration ARJ-14-Y-5017) and assault by companions, allegations which ultimately led to investigation under sections 323, 307 and 302/34 IPC. The trial court framed and examined charges and, after trial, recorded an order of acquittal on 29 March 2023. The trial court’s judgment, as reproduced in the record, proceeded from an analysis of the ocular testimony, documentary material and medical reports relied upon by prosecution and defence. The court found divergences in the statements of prosecution witnesses, delays and discrepancies in reporting the incident to police, and material differences between various eyewitness accounts about the sequence of events, the role of the accused, and whether the vehicle impact as alleged was a deliberate act. The trial court also examined medical evidence and the injury pattern, and considered whether those materials compelled the conclusion of homicidal intent or guilty participation beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal by the State through a petition for leave, the High Court undertook a re-appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence within the narrow compass permitted on appeals against acquittal. The Bench reviewed witness depositions, the medical record and attendant circumstances, noting contradictions in key witnesses’ versions about timing, the nature of blows, presence and role of the accused at the spot, and the sequence between an altercation and the vehicle event. The Court observed that several prosecution witnesses gave differing accounts regarding whether the deceased was assaulted first, whether the Bolero struck the deceased intentionally, and whether the accused were driving the vehicle that allegedly caused the injuries. The High Court also engaged with the medical evidence and the contents of injury reports; while injuries and hospital records were on the file, the Bench recorded that the medical report did not, by itself, conclusively establish the prosecution’s pleaded narrative of deliberate homicide by vehicle impact. The Court further noted the trial court’s legitimate evaluation of delays in lodging the report, discrepancies about immediate police attendance, and the absence of convincing contemporaneous corroboration that linked the accused to the fatal result in a manner that excluded all reasonable doubt. In applying principles governing appellate interference with acquittal orders, the Bench relied upon the well-settled tests reflected in recent precedents, including the requirement that an appellate court should not overturn an acquittal unless the trial court’s view is perverse, based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where no two reasonable views are possible and the only possible conclusion on the record is guilt. On re-appreciation, the High Court found that the trial court’s view was a possible view legitimately open on the evidence and that there was no patent perversity or omission warranting reversal. Concluding its examination, the Jaipur Bench held that the trial court’s acquittal suffered from no legal or factual infirmity sufficient to grant the State leave to appeal. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused and the order of acquittal dated 29 March 2023 was affirmed; a copy of this decision was directed to be sent to the trial court for information. Read complete order here By Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal
Rajasthan High Court Upholds Trial Court’s Direction to Restore FDR Funds: Axis Bank’s Petition Rejected
Rajasthan High Court Upholds Trial Court’s Direction to Restore FDR Funds: Axis Bank’s Petition Rejected Case Title: Axis Bank Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., S.B. Criminal Misc. (Petn.) No. 7763/2025.Date of Judgment: 09/12/2025. Bank appropriated funds from a Fixed Deposit Receipt (FDR) that had been ordered by the trial court to be kept in the name of the Court pending trial, and the present petition challenged the trial court’s direction (dated 16.10.2025) to refund/deposit the appropriated amount. The petitioning bank relied on an order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), Jaipur dated 20.04.2018 which had permitted temporary appropriation of the sale proceeds deposited with the bank in an FDR, and contended that the DRT order entitled it to appropriate the funds without further permission from the trial court. The criminal proceedings arose from FIR No. 43/2011 registered at Police Station Bapawar (Kota Rural) concerning alleged fraud, cheating and criminal breach of trust in relation to agricultural produce entrusted by hundreds of farmers. The trial court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 457 Cr.P.C., had on 07.07.2012 ordered auction of perishable seized produce and directed that the sale proceeds be deposited in an FDR in the name of the Court. The bank’s later application (12.04.2013) to appropriate the FDR proceeds was rejected by the trial court on 03.06.2013, and an S.B. petition filed by the bank was subsequently withdrawn with liberty to initiate recovery proceedings. The bank thereafter filed Original Application No.241/2015 before the DRT and obtained I.A. No.142/2018. The DRT, while permitting temporary appropriation, recorded that such appropriation would be without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the defendants and subject to conditions the tribunal might impose. The Rajasthan High Court’s record shows, however, that the orders of the trial court (07.07.2012 and 03.06.2013) and earlier orders of this Court were not placed before the DRT during those proceedings. On the basis of the DRT order, the petitioner-bank appropriated Rs.8,20,47,000/- from the FDR and deposited the balance. The trial court took the view that the appropriation was made in violation of its earlier orders and of orders of this Court, and therefore issued a direction dated 16.10.2025 requiring the bank to refund or re-deposit the appropriated amount with interest within seven days and issued notices to senior bank officials, including the Managing Director/CEO and the concerned Branch Manager, warning of appropriate action for non-compliance. The High Court examined the sequence of orders and petitions, including the trial court’s reasoned order under Section 457 Cr.P.C., the rejection of the bank’s interim withdrawal application, the bank’s withdrawn criminal misc. petition, and the DRT order. The Court noted that the DRT’s order appears to have been passed in ignorance of the earlier trial-court and High Court orders which had directed that the sale proceeds remain in FDR in the name of the Court. Because those earlier orders were not brought to the notice of the DRT, the DRT allowed temporary appropriation without that crucial context. Having considered the submissions of the parties and the record, the High Court held that the bank’s appropriation of the FDR amount without seeking fresh permission from the trial court was contrary to the orders dated 07.07.2012 and 03.06.2013. The Court emphasized that no one is above the law and that court orders must be obeyed. Applying these findings, the High Court found no error in the trial court’s impugned order and declined to interfere with it. Consequently, the criminal miscellaneous petition filed by Axis Bank failed and was rejected. The High Court disposed of the stay application and other pending applications, while observing that appropriate proceedings could have been initiated against the erring bank officials and that the court was sending a clear message that orders of the court must be respected. Read Complete Order here By Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal
Jaipur High Court Affirms Acquittal in Alleged Murder Case: No Interference Warranted When Trial Court’s View Is a “Possible View” on Evidence
Jaipur High Court Affirms Acquittal in Alleged Murder Case: No Interference Warranted When Trial Court’s View Is a “Possible View” on Evidence Case Title: Raju Devi Bunkar v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., D.B. Criminal Appeal (Db) No. 302/2025 — Date of Judgment: 08/12/2025 The present appeal arises from the acquittal of respondent Govind in offences including Sections 302, 342 and 323 IPC by the trial court and the subsequent challenge to that order before the High Court. The factual matrix, as recorded in the judgment, shows that on 03.11.2012 a report (P.I.-11) was lodged regarding the death of Uttam Kumar and competing versions were placed on record by family witnesses and the accused’s side; the investigation culminated in charge-sheeting under various sections and ultimately resulted in the trial court recording acquittal on 24.04.2025. 203000003022025_5 The appellate record recounts that multiple witnesses were examined in trial — including eyewitnesses, local persons and medical evidence — and that there were significant divergences in the statements and respective versions about the events of 03.11.2012. The High Court’s summary of evidence (see pages 4–6 of the file) highlights inconsistencies in eyewitness accounts, gaps in forensic/medical corroboration for homicidal assault, and particulars such as timing, injuries and the presence or absence of demonstrative indicia on the deceased’s person that bear on the reliability of the prosecution case. The learned trial court’s approach, as noticed by the Division Bench, was to closely evaluate the oral testimony presented and to find that the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the trial court therefore returned a view favourable to the accused. The High Court adverted to the trial court’s reasoning, including the manner in which the trial court treated the discrepancies and the nature of corroboration tendered, and placed those findings in the context of appellate interference doctrine. In applying established appellate principles, the Bench relied on the Supreme Court guidance cited in the judgment (Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka and related authority), reiterating that an appellate court can disturb an acquittal only where the trial court’s view is patently perverse, is based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where no two reasonable views are possible — in short, where the only possible conclusion from the record is guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The judgment reproduces and applies these principles to the facts of the case (see paragraph 13–14 of the judgment). After a considered re-appreciation of the record, the Division Bench concluded that the trial court’s view was a possible view which could reasonably be drawn from the evidence on record and that the scope for interference was therefore absent. The High Court recorded that neither legal nor factual infirmity of the nature required to overturn an acquittal was made out on the material before it, and accordingly the appellate challenge was dismissed and the trial court’s order of acquittal dated 24.04.2025 was held to be sustainable. The judgment directs that the decree be communicated to the trial court and is confined to the determination of the appeal under the criminal appellate jurisdiction; it does not re-open factual findings beyond the permissible limits of appellate review as spelled out in the authorities relied upon by the Bench. Read complete order here By Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal
Rajasthan High Court Directs Consideration of Representation for Correction of Subject in RPSC Assistant Professor Application
Rajasthan High Court Directs Consideration of Representation for Correction of Subject in RPSC Assistant Professor Application Case Title: Archana Chaudhary v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18962/2025Date of Judgment: 06.12.2025 The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, through Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ashok Kumar Jain, decided S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18962/2025 filed by Ms. Archana Chaudhary. The petitioner, aged about 33 years and resident of Jaipur, had approached the Court seeking relief in relation to her online application for the post of Assistant Professor (College Education) – 2025. Her grievance was that in Application No. 202549023583, her subject had been recorded as “Hindi” instead of “Geography,” which according to her did not match her academic qualification and earlier application record. In the writ petition, the petitioner prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (RPSC) to correct the subject in her application from “Hindi” to “Geography.” She further sought a direction that her candidature be considered for the post of Assistant Professor in the subject of Geography and that she be permitted to participate in all subsequent stages of the recruitment process accordingly. Along with this, she requested that the Court quash and set aside the verbal or oral refusal allegedly made by the Commission in regard to consideration of her representation, and that the respondents be directed to pass a reasoned and speaking order on her representation dated 01.12.2025. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a Division Bench judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Harendra Gawaria and Ors., reported as 2022 Supreme (Raj.) 643. On the strength of this decision, it was submitted that the controversy raised by the petitioner already stood covered and resolved. Relying on this precedent, it was urged that the petitioner may at least be granted permission to submit an appropriate representation before the competent authority so that her grievance regarding correction of the subject and consideration of candidature could be examined in accordance with law. The Court considered the grievance raised by the petitioner in the light of the submissions made. Instead of granting the substantive relief of direct correction of the subject in the application form or issuing a positive mandamus to treat the petitioner as a Geography candidate, the Court chose to dispose of the writ petition by providing a structured remedy through representation. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to submit a detailed representation to the respondents–authority within a period of three days, raising all grounds available to her with respect to the error in the subject and its impact on her candidature. The Court also issued clear directions to the respondents–authority regarding how such representation was to be dealt with. It directed that the representation be considered and decided after making an enquiry about the grievances raised by the petitioner. This exercise was to be undertaken in the light of the Division Bench judgment in Union of India and Ors. v. Harendra Gawaria and Ors. (supra). The Court further directed that, in case the respondents chose to deviate from the position emerging from the said judgment or otherwise did not accept the petitioner’s claim, they must pass a reasoned and speaking order. This decision was to be taken within a period of seven days from the date of receipt of the representation and in any case before 15th December 2025. The judgment also places an obligation on the respondents to communicate their decision to the petitioner. It is specifically recorded that the decision must be conveyed either by way of speed post or through e-mail, if the petitioner has provided an e-mail address in her representation. This direction ensures that the petitioner is informed of the outcome in a timely and verifiable manner, enabling her to take further steps, if necessary, without delay. Finally, the Court preserved the petitioner’s right to seek further judicial remedy. It observed that if, after the decision on her representation, the petitioner still felt aggrieved, she would be at liberty to approach the Court again by filing a fresh petition. With these directions and observations, the writ petition, along with any pending applications, was disposed of. Through this judgment, the Rajasthan High Court confined itself to providing a procedural route and a time-bound mechanism for redressal of the petitioner’s grievance regarding correction of the subject in her RPSC Assistant Professor (College Education) – 2025 application, without entering into or adjudicating upon the merits of the claim itself. Read complete order here By Advocate Bhuvesh Kumar Goyal
Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) Grants Bail under Section 483 BNSS in Alleged Online Siphoning Case
Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) Grants Bail under Section 483 BNSS in Alleged Online Siphoning Case Case Title: Tahir S/o Late Shri Illiyas v. State of RajasthanDate of Judgment: 06.12.2025 The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 14032/2025, decided on 06 December 2025 by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sameer Jain, considered a bail application filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). The accused–applicant, Tahir S/o Late Shri Illiyas, aged about 40 years and resident of Ward No. 4, Meo Mohalla, Barodameo, District Alwar, was at the time of hearing confined in Central Jail, Alwar. The case arose out of FIR No. 248/2025 registered at Police Station Baroda Meo, District Alwar. As per the order, the FIR was registered for offences under Sections 316(2), 318(4), 112(2), 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Section 66(D) of the Information Technology Act, 2008. The prosecution case, as recorded in the bail order, related to an allegation of siphoning an amount of ₹57,000/- by using a bank account on the basis of commission. The applicant had been arrested in connection with this FIR and remained in judicial custody since 30.09.2025. On behalf of the accused–applicant, learned counsel submitted before the Court that the applicant is the sole bread earner of his family. It was further pointed out that he had been in custody since 30 September 2025 and that the investigation in the matter had culminated in filing of the charge-sheet. Reliance was placed on these factual circumstances to urge that continued incarceration of the applicant was not warranted and that he may be enlarged on bail in the pending criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No. 248/2025. The learned Public Prosecutor, appearing for the State of Rajasthan, opposed the bail application. The order records that the State resisted the plea for bail and prayed for rejection of the application, without detailing any additional factual assertions beyond the offences mentioned in the FIR and the nature of allegations already noted. After hearing both sides, the Court considered “the overall facts” of the case. While doing so, the Court specifically took note of three key circumstances: first, that the applicant is the sole bread earner of his family; second, that he has remained in custody since 30.09.2025; and third, that the charge-sheet has already been filed in the matter. Having regard to these points and the overall facts and circumstances, the Court recorded that, without commenting upon the merits or demerits of the case, it was inclined to enlarge the accused–applicant on bail. Consequently, the bail application filed under Section 483 BNSS was allowed. The High Court ordered that the accused–applicant Tahir S/o Late Shri Illiyas be released on bail, subject to his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of ₹50,000/- along with two sureties of ₹25,000/- each, to the satisfaction of the learned trial Judge. The applicant was directed to appear before the concerned court on all dates of hearing as and when called upon to do so. With these conditions, the Jaipur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court granted bail to the applicant in connection with FIR No. 248/2025 registered at Police Station Baroda Meo, District Alwar. Read Complete order here By Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal
Grant of Bail Under Section 483 BNSS in Money Doubling and Online Gambling Case: Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench’s Approach
Grant of Bail Under Section 483 BNSS in Money Doubling and Online Gambling Case: Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench’s Approach Case Title: Umesh S/o Murari Lal v. State of RajasthanDate of Judgment: 06.12.2025 The Jaipur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, per Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sameer Jain, decided S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 14043/2025 filed by Umesh S/o Murari Lal, a 23-year-old accused who was in judicial custody in District Jail, Sawai Madhopur. The application was moved under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which confers special powers on the High Court and Court of Session in relation to bail. The order is a short but clear illustration of how the Court is applying the new BNSS framework to regular bail, particularly in economic offences involving online activity and gambling elements. The FIR in question, being FIR No. 315/2025 registered at Police Station Kotwali, Sawai Madhopur, invokes several provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, namely Sections 318(4), 319(2), 336(3), 338 and 112(2). Alongside these, the police have added Section 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2008 and Section 13 of the Rajasthan Public Gambling Ordinance, 1949. Collectively, these provisions point towards allegations of cheating through electronic means and participation in or promotion of gambling activities, with the specific allegation here relating to a “doubling of money” scheme where the amount involved is stated to be Rs. 83,000/-. The FIR has been lodged by the police authorities themselves, which suggests that the case emerged from investigative, cyber or surveillance inputs rather than a private complainant approaching the police directly. On behalf of the accused-applicant, learned counsel emphasised three core aspects. First, the applicant’s young age—only 23 years—was highlighted as a relevant circumstance calling for a reform-oriented approach rather than prolonged incarceration at the pre-trial stage. Second, the Court was informed that the applicant had already been in custody since 14.10.2025, meaning that by the time the bail application came up for consideration, he had spent a substantial period in jail without the trial having commenced or concluded. Third, the defence pointed out that, on the prosecution’s own showing, the monetary amount involved was Rs. 83,000/-, which, though not trivial for an individual victim, is still within a limited range in the spectrum of economic offences. These submissions, taken together, were aimed at persuading the Court that continued detention would be excessive and that the purposes of investigation could be met even if the applicant were released on conditions. The State, represented by the learned Public Prosecutors, opposed the bail application and urged the Court not to exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant. Although the order records this opposition in brief, without setting out detailed arguments, it can reasonably be inferred that the prosecution stressed the nature of the offences—particularly cheating using electronic means under the IT Act and gambling-related activity under the Rajasthan Public Gambling Ordinance—as well as the possibility of the accused engaging in similar activities if released. In such cases, State opposition normally rests on concerns of deterrence, the risk of repetition of the offence, and the need to send a message that online financial frauds and gambling rackets will be dealt with firmly. After hearing both sides, the Court proceeded to analyse the case through the lens of Section 483 BNSS. This provision, titled “Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail”, enables the High Court to grant bail in appropriate cases, subject to notice to the Public Prosecutor and other statutory safeguards. In the present matter, instead of going into a detailed examination of the evidence, the Court consciously confined itself to broad factors such as the age of the accused, the duration of custody, the amount involved, and the overall circumstances. Justice Sameer Jain clearly recorded that the applicant is a young person aged 23 years, has been in custody since 14.10.2025, and that the amount alleged in the money-doubling scheme is Rs. 83,000/-. Importantly, the Court made it explicit that it was not commenting on the merits or demerits of the prosecution case at this stage. This cautious approach is consistent with the settled principle that bail orders should not prejudge the trial or make detailed factual findings that might affect the final adjudication. Instead, the High Court focused on whether, at the present stage of proceedings, further incarceration of the applicant was necessary. Having considered the material on record, the Court came to the conclusion that the balance leaned in favour of granting bail. The reasoning reflects a broader trend in modern criminal jurisprudence, including under the BNSS, that pre-trial detention is an exception and personal liberty must be protected unless there are strong reasons to deny bail, such as risk of absconding, likelihood of tampering with evidence, or a clear threat to public order. On the basis of this assessment, the High Court allowed the application under Section 483 BNSS and directed that the accused-applicant be enlarged on bail. The conditions imposed by the Court are standard but significant: Umesh is required to furnish a personal bond of Rs. 50,000/- along with two sureties of Rs. 25,000/- each, to the satisfaction of the trial court. He is obligated to appear before the concerned court on all dates of hearing as and when called upon. These conditions serve a dual function: they secure the presence of the accused during trial and also act as a reminder that bail comes with responsibilities, not as an unfettered freedom. From a legal practitioner’s perspective, the order offers several practical takeaways. First, it confirms that under the BNSS regime, Section 483 remains a robust tool before the High Court for seeking regular bail, especially where factors such as youth, limited amount involved, and significant pre-trial custody are present. Second, even in cases involving cyber elements and gambling, the Court will not automatically treat the matter as requiring continued detention if the alleged amount is modest and the investigation does not demand the physical custody of the
Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench Follows Ravi Agarwal Precedent in Cluster of Income Tax Writ Petitions
Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench Follows Ravi Agarwal Precedent in Cluster of Income Tax Writ Petitions Case Title: Ram Babu Gupta v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle-1, Jaipur & Connected Matters Date of Judgment / Order: 06 December 2025 This order of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, deals with a large group of writ petitions filed by three assessees – Ram Babu Gupta, Ashwani Gupta and Anil Singhvi – all challenging actions of the Income Tax Department, mainly the Central Circles at Jaipur. The petitions were heard together because they raised a common legal issue arising out of income tax proceedings initiated by the Department. Looking at the array of parties, it is clear that the challenge was not to an isolated order, but to a particular pattern of action by the investigation and assessment machinery of the Department, involving the DGIT (Investigation), Principal Commissioner and various Central Circles. The Division Bench notes at the very outset that “the issue involved in these petitions is common” and therefore directs that all matters be tagged. This is a standard but important procedural step. It ensures consistency of outcome, avoids conflicting orders in similar fact situations, and saves judicial time. For taxpayers and practitioners, this tagging also signals that the petitions were part of a wider controversy in income-tax administration at Jaipur, not just a one-off grievance. The heart of the order lies in the short but significant observation that the “controversy involved in the present cases is no more res integra and stands resolved” by an earlier order of a co-ordinate Bench dated 16.09.2025 in Shri Ravi Agarwal v. Income Tax Officer & Ors., D.B. CWP No. 11981/2025. Both sides – counsel for the petitioners and counsel for the Department – agreed that the legal issue already stands concluded by that earlier judgment and jointly requested disposal of the present petitions “in terms thereof”. The expression res integra simply means that an issue is untouched or undecided. When the Bench records that the controversy is no longer res integra, it is formally accepting that the point of law has already been decided by the Court in an earlier case. This is not a casual remark: it reflects the doctrine of judicial discipline within the High Court. A Division Bench ordinarily follows the view of a co-ordinate Division Bench on the same question of law. If it wants to differ, the proper course is to refer the matter to a larger Bench. By choosing to follow Ravi Agarwal without hesitation, the Bench reaffirms that internal consistency of precedent is a key part of the rule of law. The order is also significant for the way it records the stand of counsel. Learned counsel for both sides fairly accepted that Ravi Agarwal governs the field and jointly requested that these petitions be disposed of on that basis. This is how well-conducted tax litigation should proceed. Once a legal issue has been tested and decided by the Court, repeating the same debate in every similar matter only adds to pendency and uncertainty. By inviting disposal in terms of an existing judgment, the parties allow quick relief to the assessees while ensuring that the Department also gets a clear and uniform framework to work with. Although the present order does not restate the detailed reasoning of Ravi Agarwal, it effectively extends the benefit of that precedent to all the tagged petitioners. In practical terms, this means that whatever legal protection, directions or restrictions were laid down in Ravi Agarwal now apply mutatis mutandis to Mr. Ram Babu Gupta, Mr. Ashwani Gupta and Mr. Anil Singhvi in respect of their contested income-tax proceedings. The Court uses a familiar formula – the petitions are “disposed of in terms thereof” – to import the earlier ratio without rewriting it. This technique is often used when the Court is faced with repetitive matters governed by the same principle. For assessees and tax practitioners, an order of this nature is still quite valuable despite its brevity. First, it confirms that the High Court views the petitioners’ grievances as part of an already adjudicated legal issue, which strengthens their position against any inconsistent departmental approach in future. If any lower authority tries to distinguish their case artificially, the assessees can rely on this order to say that the High Court has itself treated the controversy as identical to Ravi Agarwal. Secondly, by clubbing a series of petitions involving different assessment years, different Central Circles and even different types of departmental orders, the Court is implicitly accepting that the underlying legal defect or concern is structural rather than individual. That could relate, for example, to the manner in which certain proceedings were initiated, authorised, or transferred within the central circles. Even though the precise point is set out in Ravi Agarwal and not repeated here, this clustering makes it easier for similarly placed taxpayers to seek relief by demonstrating parity with either the lead case or these follow-up matters. Thirdly, the order brings finality to all pending applications within these petitions. By clarifying that “pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of”, the Bench leaves no loose ends. This is crucial in tax matters, where interim applications often deal with stay of demand, protection from coercive steps, or maintenance of status quo in assessment. Once the main petitions are disposed of on the strength of a precedent, those interim protections naturally merge into the final order structure laid down in the earlier judgment. From a doctrinal standpoint, the order is a neat illustration of how High Courts manage precedent in specialised areas like tax. Instead of treating each writ petition as a standalone battle, the Court identifies a “test case” – here Ravi Agarwal – and then uses it as the governing decision for subsequent matters. This practice reduces the risk of contradictory views emerging from different Benches and gives the Department clear guidance on how to align its processes with constitutional and statutory requirements. In summary, the