Arrest in India: Law, Procedure, Safeguards and Remedies
Arrest in India: A Complete, Practical Guide for People Who Fear Arrest – or Want the Law to Act If you are reading this, you are probably in one of two situations: You are afraid that you or a loved one may be arrested soon, or You are a victim and want to know how to get the accused arrested. In both situations, the word “arrest” creates fear, confusion and a feeling of helplessness. As a practising lawyer, I can tell you: half of this fear comes from not knowing the law. This article is written in simple English, from the point of view of a common person, but with the seriousness and depth that a senior advocate would bring. It focuses on current law after the new criminal codes (Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita – BNS, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita – BNSS) and also mentions the older CrPC section numbers that people still search for. 1. Which law applies today? BNSS vs CrPC From 1 July 2024, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) has replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) for new cases. It lays down the procedure for arrest, investigation, trial and bail. However: Older cases may still be governed by CrPC, The principles on arrest and rights remain broadly similar. Throughout this article, I will write like this: Section 35 BNSS (earlier Section 41 & 41A CrPC) – arrest without warrant so that you can understand both the new and the old references that appear in FIRs, orders, and on the internet. 2. What exactly is “arrest”? Arrest means taking a person into custody under legal authority, in such a manner that the person’s liberty is restrained and he/she is not free to leave. It is different from: Calling to the police station for enquiry – where you are technically free to leave, though in practice this is often misused. Simple questioning at home or on the road – this alone is not arrest. Detention – sometimes police say “we have only detained you, not arrested you”. If you are not free to go, the law and courts may still treat it as arrest or illegal detention. 3. Who can arrest in India? Under BNSS Chapter V – Arrest of Persons, the following can arrest: Police officers This is the most common. They can arrest with or without warrant depending on the case. Private persons A common citizen can arrest someone who commits a cognizable and non-bailable offence in his presence, like a serious violent crime, and must hand him over to the police immediately (Section 40 BNSS, earlier Section 43 CrPC). Magistrates A Magistrate can himself order and even personally arrest a person committing an offence in his presence (Section 41 BNSS, earlier Section 44 CrPC). On refusal to give name and address If a person is reasonably suspected of an offence and refuses to give his name and residence, police may arrest him to find these details (Section 39 BNSS, earlier Section 42 CrPC). Preventive arrest by police Under Section 170 BNSS (earlier Section 151 CrPC), police can make preventive arrest to stop the commission of a cognizable offence if it cannot be otherwise prevented. 4. When can police arrest without warrant? – Section 35 BNSS / Section 41 CrPC This is the heart of modern arrest law. 4.1 General power Under Section 35 BNSS, any police officer may arrest without a warrant in certain situations – for example, where a person: Commits an offence in the presence of the police officer. Is reasonably suspected of having committed a cognizable offence (serious offences like cheating above certain amounts, hurt, theft, rape, etc.). Is a proclaimed offender or is found with stolen property, etc. 4.2 The “necessity test” – police must justify arrest The Supreme Court has repeatedly said: “Having the power to arrest is one thing, the justification to arrest is another.” Section 35 BNSS (like old Section 41 CrPC) now builds this into the law. Police must consider whether arrest is necessary for reasons such as: To prevent further offences. To stop the accused from tampering with evidence. To prevent the accused from threatening or influencing witnesses. To ensure the accused appears in court. If these reasons do not exist, police are expected not to arrest and instead use notice of appearance (see next part). 4.3 Special protection for elderly and infirm Section 35(7) BNSS provides that no arrest shall be made for certain minor offences (punishable with less than 3 years) where the person is infirm or above 60 years, without prior permission of a senior police officer (not below DSP rank). This is important if you are worried about arrest of elderly parents or sick persons in a family dispute. 5. Notice instead of arrest – the Arnesh Kumar principle Under old CrPC, Section 41A allowed police to issue a notice to appear instead of arrest. Under BNSS, this concept is merged into Section 35 itself. The Supreme Court, in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, strongly criticised routine arrests, especially in offences like Section 498A IPC, and directed that: Police should first issue a notice asking the accused to join the investigation. Arrest should be made only if the accused does not cooperate or if the necessity test is satisfied. Many High Courts continue to reinforce these directions even under BNSS. If you receive such a notice: Do not ignore it. Immediately contact a lawyer. Cooperate, but do not give self-incriminating detailed statements without legal advice. 6. Arrest with warrant – when does the court issue a warrant? Arrest with warrant is regulated under BNSS “Processes to Compel Appearance” (corresponding to Chapter VI of CrPC). A Magistrate may issue a warrant of arrest when: A complaint or police report (FIR/final report) is before the court. The court takes cognizance of an offence and finds that the presence of the accused is needed. The offence is serious or the accused has not responded to summons/notices. Warrants may be: Bailable –
Anticipatory bail: law, procedure & Supreme Court guidelines
Anticipatory bail: law, procedure & Supreme Court guidelines Anticipatory bail is one of the most powerful protections available in Indian criminal procedure. Properly invoked, it can preserve an individual’s liberty in the face of motivated FIRs, business disputes given a criminal colour, or investigations where arrest is used more as pressure than as a genuine investigative necessity. At the same time, courts are acutely conscious that pre-arrest bail cannot be allowed to become a shield for hardened offenders, sexual offences against children, or serious economic crime. The modern law on anticipatory bail is therefore a careful balance between personal liberty under Article 21 and the interests of a fair investigation. This article gives a complete practitioner-level overview of anticipatory bail in India as of 2025, written in simple language but with the depth and nuance expected from a senior counsel. 1. What is anticipatory bail? “Anticipatory bail” simply means bail in anticipation of arrest – an order of the Sessions Court or High Court that if the applicant is arrested in a specified case, they shall be released on bail without being taken into custody. The expression “anticipatory bail” was coined by the Law Commission in its 41st Report and adopted by Parliament when inserting Section 438 in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Although the statute itself does not use the phrase, it has become standard legal terminology. Today, for new cases under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), the equivalent provision is Section 482 BNSS – “Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest”. In essence: The applicant has not yet been arrested, but reasonably fears arrest in a non-bailable offence. The court, if satisfied, directs that in the event of such arrest, the person shall be released on bail subject to conditions. 2. Statutory framework: CrPC vs BNSS (a) Section 438 CrPC – the original provision Section 438 CrPC (inserted in 1973) empowered the Court of Session or High Court to grant anticipatory bail where a person had reason to believe they might be arrested on accusation of a non-bailable offence. Key points under Section 438: Forum – Sessions Court or High Court (concurrent jurisdiction). Stage – any time after there is a concrete apprehension of arrest; FIR need not always be registered, but vague or speculative fear is not enough. Conditions – court could impose conditions relating to cooperation with investigation, non-tampering with evidence, travel restrictions, etc. Special amendment – the 2005 Amendment Act inserted a detailed version of Section 438, but that amended text was never brought into force nationally; Law Commission’s 203rd Report reviewed this in detail. Even after BNSS has come into force, Section 438 CrPC remains relevant for: offences investigated and tried under the old CrPC/IPC framework during the transition; and older case-law, which continues to guide interpretation, since the new provision is largely pari materia (similar in substance). (b) Section 482 BNSS – the new anticipatory bail provision With effect from 1 July 2024, BNSS has replaced CrPC for new cases. Anticipatory bail is now governed by Section 482 BNSS. Important features of Section 482 BNSS: Same basic structure as Section 438 CrPC Any person who “has reason to believe” that they may be arrested for a non-bailable offence may apply to the Sessions Court or High Court. The court may direct that in the event of arrest, the person shall be released on bail. Illustrative conditions (Section 482(2))The court may impose conditions such as: making oneself available for interrogation; not inducing or threatening witnesses; not leaving India without permission; and any conditions similar to regular bail conditions under Section 480(3) BNSS. Sub-section (3): binding effect on police and MagistrateIf a person with anticipatory bail is arrested without warrant and is prepared to furnish bail, the police officer must release him on bail, and if a Magistrate issues a warrant, it must be a bailable warrant in conformity with the anticipatory bail directions. Sub-section (4): statutory bar for certain sexual offencesSection 482(4) expressly excludes anticipatory bail where the arrest is for offences under: Section 65 BNS – aggravated rape on girl under 16 / under 12; and Section 70(2) BNS – gang rape on a woman under 18. Wider judicial discretionCommentators and several High Courts have noted that BNSS removes the earlier “guiding factors” that were written into the text of Section 438 CrPC (such as gravity of accusation, antecedents, likelihood of absconding), leaving these to judicial discretion, and thereby widening the protective scope of anticipatory bail. Effect on State amendmentsSome States had previously restricted anticipatory bail by amendments (e.g. Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand). Recent High Court decisions, particularly the Allahabad High Court and references by the Uttarakhand High Court, have held that Section 482 BNSS, being a re-enacted central provision, can override inconsistent state amendments in many contexts. 3. Object and philosophy of anticipatory bail The Law Commission and the Supreme Court have consistently emphasised that the object of anticipatory bail is to safeguard personal liberty and protect individuals against arbitrary or motivated arrest. Anticipatory bail: prevents arrest from being used as a tool of harassment or humiliation; recognises that “arrest itself is a form of punishment”, especially for professionals, public figures or businesspersons; ensures that genuine disputes (for example, civil or commercial matters) are not given a criminal colour purely to coerce payment or settlement; and still allows the court to deny protection where the case genuinely requires custodial interrogation or where the applicant is likely to obstruct justice. 4. Landmark Supreme Court judgments on anticipatory bail (a) Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab (1980) – Constitution Bench This is the foundational judgment on anticipatory bail. The Constitution Bench rejected any narrow or restrictive interpretation of Section 438 and laid down broad principles: No rigid conditions or formulae – Parliament deliberately left the provision flexible; courts must decide case-by-case. Discretion is to be exercised judiciously, not mechanically – the court must look at the nature of accusation, antecedents, possibility of absconding, and whether the accusation
Rajasthan High Court Clarifies Non-Enforceability of State Litigation Policy, 2018 and Scope of Quo Warranto Against Additional Advocate General
Rajasthan High Court Clarifies Non-Enforceability of State Litigation Policy, 2018 and Scope of Quo Warranto Against Additional Advocate General Date of Judgment: 02.12.2025 The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, comprising Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice Mr. Sanjeev Prakash Sharma and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Baljinder Singh Sandhu, in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 151/2025, has dismissed a challenge to the appointment of an Additional Advocate General (AAG) for the State of Rajasthan before the Supreme Court. The judgment, delivered on 2 December 2025, settles two important questions: whether the Rajasthan State Litigation Policy, 2018 is legally enforceable, and whether the office of Additional Advocate General is a “public office” amenable to a writ of quo warranto. The appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition in the nature of quo warranto filed by the appellant, a practising advocate, who questioned the eligibility of respondent No. 2, Shri Padmesh Mishra, to hold the post of Additional Advocate General for cases in the Supreme Court. The main grievance was that the appointee allegedly did not fulfil the minimum 10 years’ practice requirement under the State Litigation Policy, 2018, and that the insertion of Clause 14.8 in the Policy was arbitrary and colourable. In affirming the learned Single Judge’s order, the Division Bench has delivered a reasoned and doctrinally important judgment which will guide future litigation on appointments of law officers and interpretation of litigation policies in Rajasthan. Factual Background and Issues Before the Court The appellant, appearing in person, had initially filed a writ petition seeking a writ of quo warranto against respondent No. 2, challenging his appointment as Additional Advocate General vide order dated 23.08.2024. The challenge was based on two broad grounds. First, that respondent No. 2 did not have the minimum experience of 10 years’ practice as an advocate required for the post of Additional Advocate General under Clause 14.4 of the Rajasthan State Litigation Policy, 2018. Second, that Clause 14.8 – inserted by notification dated 23.08.2024 – conferred unguided powers on the State to appoint “any counsel” to “any post” after considering his expertise, and was therefore arbitrary and colourable. The learned Single Judge rejected the writ petition, holding that the post of Additional Advocate General is not a “public office” for the purpose of quo warranto and that the Litigation Policy is not a statutory instrument. The Single Judge also relied on earlier Division Bench judgment in Ishwar Prasad v. State of Rajasthan and on the Supreme Court decision in Dr. Abhinav Sharma v. Sunil Samdaria. In appeal, the appellant reiterated that the State Litigation Policy, 2018 had acquired enforceability, particularly because it was brought in pursuant to observations of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Man Sukh Das and because the amendment inserting Clause 14.8 had been notified in the Gazette. The State, on the other hand, argued that the Policy was merely a set of administrative guidelines, without statutory force, and could not be used to ground a writ of quo warranto or invalidate an appointment. Nature and Scope of Writ of Quo Warranto The Bench began its legal analysis by revisiting Article 226 of the Constitution and the settled principles governing writs of quo warranto. Relying on B.R. Kapur v. State of T.N., Bharati Reddy v. State of Karnataka and Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei Sahoo, the Court reiterated that a writ of quo warranto lies to challenge the authority of a person holding a public office of a substantive character. Such a writ can be issued only when indisputable facts show that either the incumbent did not satisfy the statutory qualifications at the time of appointment, or has incurred a statutory disqualification. The Court emphasised that the scope of judicial review in a quo warranto proceeding is limited, and cannot be expanded to question matters of subjective satisfaction or executive discretion that are not governed by statutory norms. In particular, it held that a writ of quo warranto cannot be grounded on alleged violation of executive guidelines, circulars or policies that lack statutory character. Is the Additional Advocate General a “Public Office”? A substantial portion of the judgment is devoted to the nature of the post of Additional Advocate General and other government counsel. The Bench undertook a detailed survey of Supreme Court precedents, starting from Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., which recognised a public element in the office of District Government Counsel, and then considering how later decisions refined this position. The Court noted that in State of U.P. v. Johri Mal and State of U.P. v. Ajay Kumar Sharma, the Supreme Court underlined the distinction between Assistant Public Prosecutors, who are civil servants holding posts under the State, and Public Prosecutors or Government Counsel, who remain practising advocates engaged on tenure basis. Their appointments may have a public element and are subject to fair procedure, but they are not “public offices” in the strict sense, nor are they governed by service rules framed under Article 309. Building on these authorities, the Division Bench held that the Advocate General, appointed under Article 165 of the Constitution, does hold a public office, with administrative and financial powers, and can be said to be a constitutional functionary. However, Additional Advocate Generals and other Government Counsel do not fall in the same category. They are essentially law officers engaged to assist the Advocate General, with no fixed tenure, no statutory cadre and no independent administrative responsibility for government actions. Their role is case-centric or department-centric, and their arguments are guided by briefs received from the State. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the post of Additional Advocate General in Rajasthan is not a “public office” of the type for which a writ of quo warranto can be issued. On this ground alone, the petition was held to be not maintainable. Rajasthan State Litigation Policy, 2018: Guideline or Enforceable Law? The central plank of the appellant’s case was that the Rajasthan State Litigation Policy, 2018
Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench Suspends Sentence in Lekhraj Meena v. State of Rajasthan: Principles on Bail Pending Appeal Reiterate
Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench Suspends Sentence in Lekhraj Meena v. State of Rajasthan: Principles on Bail Pending Appeal Reiterate Date of Judgment: 02.12.2025 The Jaipur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, per Hon’ble Mr. Justice Uma Shanker Vyas, has allowed an application for suspension of sentence filed by accused–applicant Lekhraj Meena in S.B. Criminal Appeal (SB) No. 3120/2025, arising out of Sessions Case No. 01/2020. The order, passed on 02.12.2025 in S.B. Criminal Misc. Suspension of Sentence Application No. 2413/2025, once again reiterates the settled approach of appellate courts while considering suspension of sentence under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure during the pendency of a criminal appeal. In this matter, the appellant, aged about 30 years and presently confined in Central Jail, Jaipur, had approached the High Court assailing his conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court. Along with the appeal, he moved an application seeking suspension of the substantive sentence, essentially praying for bail during the pendency of the appeal. The State, represented by the Public Prosecutor, opposed the prayer for suspension of sentence. On behalf of the accused–applicant, it was argued that there was no reliable and legally acceptable evidence on record to justify his conviction for the alleged offences. The counsel submitted that the appeal raises substantial questions and that the applicant has every likelihood of succeeding in the criminal appeal. Importantly, it was pointed out that during the course of the trial the accused–applicant had remained on bail and there was no allegation of misuse of liberty or violation of conditions during that period. This past conduct on bail is a significant factor which appellate courts routinely take into account while deciding applications for suspension of sentence. Another plank of the defence argument was the likely delay in disposal of the criminal appeal. Given the docket position of appellate courts and the time that final hearing may ordinarily take, it was submitted that continued incarceration of the appellant, despite an arguable case on merits, would cause undue prejudice. The accused–applicant also expressed willingness to deposit the entire fine amount imposed by the trial court. This readiness to comply with the monetary component of the sentence further weighed in favour of granting him interim indulgence. The learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, vehemently opposed the prayer for suspension of sentence. Although the order does not detail the specific grounds of opposition, such resistance generally stems from the gravity of the offence, the nature of evidence, and concerns regarding the possibility of absconding or tampering with witnesses. Nevertheless, the Court, after hearing both sides and perusing the material available on record, proceeded to form an opinion on the application. Without entering into a threadbare examination of the merits or demerits of the conviction, the High Court recorded that, considering the arguments advanced, it deemed it just and proper to suspend the sentence awarded to the applicant. This approach is in line with the settled law that, at the stage of suspension of sentence, the appellate court is not required to conduct a mini trial or reappreciate evidence in detail. It must, however, satisfy itself that the appeal is not frivolous, that there is an arguable case, and that factors such as the period of sentence, conduct of the accused and delay in final hearing justify the grant of bail during appeal. The Court, therefore, allowed the application for suspension of sentence subject to an important condition: the accused–applicant must deposit the fine imposed by the learned trial court. Only upon such deposition does the benefit of suspension of sentence become operative. This reflects a balanced approach, ensuring that while the liberty of the appellant is protected, the punitive and deterrent element of the monetary fine is not kept in abeyance. In terms of conditions, the order directs that the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the accused–applicant, Lekhraj Meena son of Shri Murari Lal Meena, shall remain suspended during the pendency of the appeal. He is to be released on bail upon furnishing a personal bond of ₹1,00,000 along with two sureties of ₹50,000 each to the satisfaction of the trial court. The Court has further stipulated that the appellant must appear before the High Court on 05.01.2026 and thereafter as and when called upon to do so. These conditions are consistent with the objective of securing the presence of the appellant at future hearings and preventing any abuse of the concession granted. From a legal standpoint, this order fits within the broader framework of Section 389 CrPC, which empowers the appellate court to suspend execution of the sentence pending appeal and release the convict on bail. Indian appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, have repeatedly emphasised that when the appeal is likely to take considerable time for final disposal, and the convict has already undergone a substantial part of the sentence or has a credible case on merits, suspension of sentence may be justified, particularly where the accused has not misused liberty when previously on bail. The present order of the Rajasthan High Court reflects adherence to these guiding principles in a concise but clear manner. The fact that the Court has explicitly refrained from commenting on the merits of the case is also notable. Any detailed observations at this stage could prejudice the appeal, either against the appellant or the prosecution. By confining itself to a broad satisfaction that it is a fit case for suspension of sentence, the High Court preserves the sanctity of the future appellate hearing while simultaneously ensuring that the appellant is not unnecessarily kept in custody during a potentially long wait. For practitioners and litigants, this judgment from the Jaipur Bench underscores key practical takeaways. First, prior conduct on bail during trial remains a strong factor in favour of suspension of sentence. Second, a clear statement regarding the readiness to deposit the entire fine amount can further strengthen an application. Third, demonstrating that the appeal raises arguable issues and that final hearing will reasonably take
Rajasthan High Court Grants Bail in Cyber Crime Case under BNSS: Kamlesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan
Rajasthan High Court Grants Bail in Cyber Crime Case under BNSS: Kamlesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan Date of Judgment: 03.12.2025 The Jaipur Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, in S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 13750/2025, Kamlesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, has granted regular bail to a 22-year-old accused booked in a cyber-fraud case under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and the Information Technology Act, 2000. The order dated 03.12.2025 was passed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sameer Jain while exercising powers under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). The case arose from FIR No. 07/2024 registered at Cyber Crime Police Station, Baran, District Baran. The prosecution has invoked Sections 316(2), 318(4), 319(2) and 61(2) of the BNS, 2023 along with Sections 66C and 66D of the IT Act, provisions typically attracted in cases involving cheating, impersonation and fraudulent electronic transactions. The investigation apparently traced substantial online financial movement, and the State specifically highlighted that several complaints had been lodged against the accused on the National Cyber Crime Portal on the helpline number 1930. This background was pressed by the prosecution to oppose the bail plea and to suggest that the accused was part of a wider pattern of cyber fraud. On the other side, counsel for the accused-applicant emphasised personal and procedural factors rather than contesting the merits of the allegations at this stage. It was submitted that Kamlesh Kumar, aged about 22 years, is the sole breadwinner of his family and that he has already undergone about two and a half months of incarceration. The defence also pointed out that the investigation has culminated in filing of the charge-sheet and that the case is triable by a Magistrate, and therefore prolonged pre-trial custody would serve no useful purpose. These submissions were aimed at bringing the case within the settled parameters of bail jurisprudence, where the nature of offence, stage of investigation, length of custody and the profile of the accused are all relevant considerations. The Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed the application and relied on two principal aspects. First, the existence of multiple complaints on the National Cyber Crime Portal was presented as an indicator of repetitive or large-scale fraudulent conduct. Second, the prosecution stressed that the “financial transaction of enormous amount” involved in the case warranted continued custody. Though the order does not detail the sums involved, the court clearly had before it material suggesting that the case was not a petty or isolated incident. The State thus sought to treat the matter as a serious economic offence in the digital space, an area where courts are increasingly cautious, keeping in mind the rise of online frauds and the difficulty in securing digital evidence. After hearing both sides, the High Court balanced the competing considerations of individual liberty and the interests of effective prosecution. The Court specifically recorded that the accused is 22 years old, is the sole bread earner of his family, has been in custody for about two and a half months, that the charge-sheet has already been filed and that the case is triable by a Magistrate. These factors show that the Court applied the familiar “triple test” of bail in a practical manner: once investigation is complete and the accused is not shown to be a flight risk or likely to tamper with evidence, continued detention becomes more difficult to justify, particularly when the trial forum is a Magistrate’s court. The Court also consciously refrained from commenting on the merits or demerits of the allegations, thereby ensuring that the trial remains uninfluenced and that the bail order does not prejudge the evidence. In this backdrop, the Court held that it was inclined to enlarge the accused on bail. Exercising powers under Section 483 BNSS, which broadly corresponds to the earlier Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to the High Court’s inherent authority to grant bail, the application was allowed. Kamlesh Kumar was ordered to be released on furnishing a personal bond of ₹50,000 with two sureties of ₹25,000 each, to the satisfaction of the trial court. The condition regarding regular appearance before the trial court on all dates of hearing reinforces that bail is a conditional liberty, and that the accused remains answerable to the process of law throughout the trial. This order is significant for cyber-crime prosecutions under the new BNS–BNSS framework. Even where multiple online complaints and substantial financial transactions are stated to be involved, the Rajasthan High Court has reiterated that pre-trial incarceration cannot be treated as a substitute for punishment. The judgment shows that once the investigation is complete and the accused has spent a reasonable period in custody, bail will ordinarily follow unless there are strong reasons on record to believe that release will obstruct justice. The emphasis on youth, sole breadwinner status and Magistrate-triable nature of the offence illustrates that human and socio-economic considerations continue to play an important role in bail decisions, even in technologically complex economic offences. For practitioners, this decision from the Jaipur Bench underscores that bail applications in cyber-crime matters should carefully highlight completion of investigation, length of custody, the forum of trial and the personal circumstances of the accused, while assuring the court on cooperation and regular attendance. Simultaneously, the State is reminded that mere reference to large financial transactions or multiple complaints, without concrete material to show risk of absconding or interference with evidence, may not be sufficient to defeat a well-founded plea for bail under Section 483 BNSS. Read Complete Order Here By Advocate Bhuvnesh Kumar Goyal
Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench Protects Live-in Couple’s Right to Life and Liberty Despite Boy Not Being of Marriageable Age
Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench Protects Live-in Couple’s Right to Life and Liberty Despite Boy Not Being of Marriageable Age The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in Priya Suman & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., has once again reaffirmed that the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution stands on a higher pedestal than social disapproval of relationships. The Court held that even where a boy has not yet attained the statutory age of marriage (21 years), two consenting majors who choose to live together in a live-in relationship are entitled to protection of their life and liberty, and the State is duty-bound to ensure such protection. In this case, petitioner no.1, an 18-year-old girl, and petitioner no.2, a 19-year-old boy, were residing together at Kota. They had executed a live-in relationship agreement on 27.10.2025 and expressed their intention to marry once the boy attains the requisite age of 21 years under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The girl’s family members strongly opposed this decision and allegedly issued threats to the couple, creating a serious apprehension of harm to their life and personal liberty. The petitioners approached the Nodal Officer (SHO, Police Station Kunadi, Kota) through written representations dated 13.11.2025 and 17.11.2025, but no effective action was taken, compelling them to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court seeking protection. The core legal issue before the Court was narrow yet sensitive: whether two young adults, both majors but with the boy below the marriageable age of 21 years, can seek protection of their life and liberty while living together in a consensual live-in relationship, especially when their families oppose the relationship and allegedly threaten them. The State opposed the petition by arguing that since the boy had not yet attained the age of marriage, he could neither lawfully marry nor be allowed to stay in a live-in relationship, and therefore the petition itself deserved to be rejected. Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand rejected this approach and drew a clear distinction between (i) the validity of marriage under personal law and (ii) the independent guarantee of life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. Referring to Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Court acknowledged that the minimum marriageable age is 18 years for the bride and 21 years for the bridegroom, and that the only hurdle in solemnisation of marriage in the present case was the age of petitioner no.2. However, the Court emphasised that this statutory bar on immediate marriage cannot be a ground to leave the couple at the mercy of hostile family members or to deny them protection against threats to life and safety. The Court placed significant reliance on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Nandakumar & Anr. v. State of Kerala & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 597 of 2018), where the husband was below 21 years at the time of marriage. The Supreme Court had held that such a marriage between two Hindus is not void but at best voidable under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and more importantly, that even if the parties were not competent to marry, they still had the right to live together in a live-in relationship. The present judgment follows the same principle by accepting that “live-in relationship” is a legally recognised arrangement under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and that two majors are free to cohabit even outside wedlock. Justice Dhand also referred to the landmark decision in Lata Singh v. State of U.P. (AIR 2006 SC 2522), wherein the Supreme Court categorically held that a live-in relationship between two consenting adults does not constitute an offence, and that the couple’s choice of partner must be respected. The Court then examined a series of High Court decisions, including Rekha Meghwanshi & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 1730/2024, Principal Seat Jodhpur), Seema Kaur v. State of Punjab (Punjab & Haryana High Court), and Mafi & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (CRWP No. 691/2021), which uniformly hold that even if the relationship or marriage is not strictly valid in law, the State cannot abdicate its constitutional duty to protect the lives of adult individuals facing threats on account of their relationship choices. A particularly important part of the reasoning is the Court’s reiteration that Article 21 is not conditioned upon the legality or social acceptance of a personal relationship. The judgment notes that the right to choose one’s partner and to cohabit with that person is an inseparable facet of personal liberty and human dignity. The Court echoes the Supreme Court’s observations in Shakti Vahini v. Union of India, where honour killings and family-driven violence against couples were strongly condemned and it was held that State authorities must protect couples from such illegal interference in their personal choices. By quoting and relying on these precedents, the Rajasthan High Court sends a clear message that parents and relatives cannot dictate the life choices of adult children or subject them to threats merely because they disagree with a relationship. The judgment also highlights the statutory duty of the police machinery. Under Section 29 of the Rajasthan Police Act, 2007, every police officer is duty-bound to protect the life and personal liberty of citizens. Justice Dhand observes that when a couple has already approached the Nodal Officer with a specific complaint and threat perception, the officer cannot ignore such representation. Instead, it is expected that the representation be considered in accordance with law, the threat perception be objectively analysed, and appropriate security be provided where necessary. The Court, therefore, directs the Nodal Officer (SHO, Police Station Kunadi, Kota) to decide the petitioners’ representation and, after assessing the threat, pass suitable orders for granting security and protection to the couple. At the same time, the Court carefully confines the scope of its order. It clarifies that all observations have been made only for the limited purpose of disposing
Rajasthan High Court Grants Bail to 19-Year-Old Accused under Section 309(4) BNS Analysis of Dhan Singh Faujdar v. State of Rajasthan
Rajasthan High Court Grants Bail to 19-Year-Old Accused under Section 309(4) BNS Analysis of Dhan Singh Faujdar v. State of Rajasthan Background of the Case The present order has been passed by the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 13411/2025, titled Dhan Singh Faujdar v. State of Rajasthan, decided on 01.12.2025 by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sameer Jain. The accused-applicant, Dhan Singh Faujdar, aged about 19 years, was arrested in connection with FIR No. 282/2025 registered at Police Station Kotwali, District Bharatpur, for offences under Section 309(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). He has been in judicial custody since 15.08.2025 and is presently lodged in Central Jail, Bharatpur. The application before the High Court was filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) seeking regular bail. Notably, the prosecution record also showed five criminal antecedents against the applicant, in which he had already been acquitted in four cases, with one case apparently still subsisting. Defence Submissions On behalf of the accused-applicant, it was argued that he is a young boy of 19 years and continued incarceration at this formative age would cause irreparable harm to his future. The defence pointed out that the co-accused in the same FIR had already been enlarged on bail by the learned trial Court, and therefore the principle of parity required that the present applicant also be given similar relief. Counsel submitted that the applicant has been in custody since 15.08.2025, and the investigating agency has already filed the charge-sheet. Hence, the investigation is complete and his further detention is no longer necessary for the purposes of investigation. It was further emphasized that out of the five criminal antecedents, the applicant stands acquitted in four, indicating that earlier allegations did not withstand judicial scrutiny. Another important plank of the defence was the likely delay in conclusion of trial. Considering the usual pace of criminal trials, it was argued that the proceedings are likely to take a long time and no useful purpose would be served by keeping a 19-year-old behind bars for an uncertain period when the presumption of innocence still operates in his favour. Stand of the Prosecution The learned Public Prosecutor opposed the bail application and vehemently resisted the plea for release. Though the order does not detail every argument of the State, the opposition indicates that the prosecution considered either the nature of the offence, the antecedents, or the gravity of allegations as sufficient to deny bail. However, despite this opposition, the Court weighed the competing interests and applied settled principles governing grant of bail, ultimately tilting the balance in favour of personal liberty, subject to conditions. Judicial Reasoning and Findings After hearing both sides, the Court considered the following key factors: First, the Court took note of the age of the accused-applicant — only 19 years. Juvenile or near-juvenile age has consistently been treated by courts as a relevant consideration while dealing with bail, as incarceration at a young age can severely impact rehabilitation and reintegration into society. Second, the Court relied on the factor of parity. The co-accused in the same case had already been granted bail by the trial court. When multiple accused are similarly placed on facts and law, denying bail to one while granting it to others is generally seen as unjustified unless there is some distinguishing material. No such strong distinguishing factor was shown against Dhan Singh. Third, the Court recorded that the accused-applicant has been in custody since 15.08.2025 and that the charge-sheet has been filed. Once investigation is complete and the accused is no longer required for custodial interrogation, the continued detention largely serves the purpose of securing his presence at trial, which can often be adequately ensured by appropriate conditions and sureties. Fourth, the Court noted the criminal antecedents but simultaneously acknowledged that in four out of the five earlier cases, the accused has already been acquitted. This shows that mere pendency of previous cases or existence of past FIRs, without resulting conviction, cannot by itself be a ground to deny bail, especially when the accused is a young adult. Lastly, keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances and the material on record, the Court concluded that further incarceration would serve no useful purpose while the trial is likely to take time. At the same time, the Court consciously refrained from making any comment on the merits or demerits of the prosecution case to ensure that the trial remains uninfluenced. Operative Order In light of these considerations, the High Court allowed the bail application under Section 483 BNSS. The accused-applicant, Dhan Singh Faujdar S/o Ramu Singh, was ordered to be released on bail subject to the following conditions: He shall furnish a personal bond of ₹50,000/- along with two sureties of ₹25,000/- each to the satisfaction of the learned trial Judge. He is required to appear before the concerned Court on all dates of hearing as and when called upon to do so. The order thus restores the applicant’s liberty but keeps sufficient safeguards in place to ensure his presence during trial. Legal Significance of the Judgment This order, though brief, is significant in the context of the new criminal procedure regime under the BNSS. It demonstrates that while statutory provisions have changed nomenclature and structure, the core constitutional principles governing bail remain intact: Presumption of innocence continues to be the foundational principle. Pre-trial detention cannot be used as a form of punishment. Bail, not jail remains the rule, especially where investigation is complete, the accused is a young person, and there is no concrete material to show that he will abscond or tamper with evidence. Parity among co-accused is reaffirmed; once co-accused have obtained bail and stand on a similar footing, courts are inclined to extend similar benefit unless there is a clear reason to differentiate. Long custody and delay in trial are recognised as strong grounds in favour of bail, preventing an accused from effectively undergoing a sentence even before